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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises out of Rubio Izaguirre's ("Izaguirre") attempt to avoid his contractual 
and statutory obligations to repay worker's compensation benefits expended by his former 
employer, R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC ("R&L Carriers"), and its surety, Zurich 
American Insurance Co. ("Zurich") (collectively "Respondents"), out of a third-party liability 
settlement he reached with Ameri-Co Carriers, Inc. and Jimmy L. Crossland. 
Relying on the plain language ofldaho Code § 72-223(3) and well-established Idaho 
precedent that provide employers, sureties, and employees with notice regarding how statutory 
subrogation under Idaho Code § 72-223(3) works, the Industrial Commission entered its Findings 
ofFact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (the "Order") that reaffirmed the intent ofthe Legislature 
that the entirety of proceeds from a third-party settlement in which the employer/surety did not 
participate is subject to subrogation under Idaho Code§ 72-223(3). It is from this Order that 
Izaguirre now appeals. 
B. Course of Proceedin~s. 
Respondents generally agree with Izaguirre's Course of Proceedings Below. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts. 
Respondents agree with the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact set forth in 
paragraphs 1-30 ofthe Order. (R., pp. 96-103.) 
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1. Additional Facts. 
In June 2008, Izaguirre and his wife retained D. Scott Summer to represent them in a 
lawsuit against the driver who caused Izaguirre's industrial accident. (R., p. 101, ~ 23.) On 
October 22, 2009, Izaguirre and his wife settled their third-party claim for $200,000. (!d.) A 
letter drafted by Mr. Summer after the settlement purports to break down the total settlement, 
attributing $100,000 to Mrs. Izaguirre's claim for loss of consortium and $100,000 to Claimant's 
personal injury claim. (!d.) Per the attorney/client agreement, Mr. Summer was paid 35% of the 
settlement amount for his attorney fee, equaling $70,000. (!d.) 
At the date of the third party mediation that resolved the third-party liability case, 
Respondents had a subrogated interest of$43,518.65. (R., p. 101, ~ 24.) Respondents and 
Izaguirre, through his attorney, agreed to payment of a 25% attorney fee based on the recovery of 
the subrogated amount. (!d.) Thus, Mr. Summer reimbursed $32,623.99 to Respondents, and 
retained $10,879.66 payable as attorney fees. (/d.) Mr. Summer did not argue for an 
apportionment oflzaguirre's damages or contest payment of Respondents' full subrogated 
interest. Subsequently, Izaguirre ended his relationship with Mr. Summer and hired Richard 
Owen, his present attorney. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The appellate rules contemplate that Respondents set forth "additional" issues presented 
on appeal if the issues listed in Appellant's Brief are insufficient, incomplete or raise additional 
issues for review. Idaho Appellant Rule 3 5(b )( 4 ). Although Izaguirre raises the issues he 
disputes from the Order, he fails to acknowledge the two issues that are fatal to his appeal. 
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Respondents will attempt to set forth those dispositive issues on appeal that Izaguirre did not 
identify. 
1. Whether the Order is a "final decision or order" from the Industrial Commission 
as required under Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (d). 
2. Whether the Release of All Claims and Indemnity Agreement executed by 
Izaguirre and his wife renders Izaguirre's claim for apportionment of damages in this case moot. 
3. Whether the Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in deciding that 
Respondents' subrogation rights pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) extend to all oflzaguirre's 
third-party settlement, including any potential monies for pain and suffering. 
4. Whether the Industrial Commission erred in failing to designate part of Izaguirre's 
third-party settlement as pain and suffering damages. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review on Appeal 
1. Standard of Review for Whether Izaguirre is Appealing a Final Decision or 
Order 
On appeal, this Court must address finality even if the parties fail to raise it because the 
issueisjurisdictional. Hartmanv. DoubleLMfg., 141 ldaho456,457, 111 P.3d 141,142 
(2005). An appeal from the Industrial Commission may only be taken from "any final decision 
or order of the Industrial Commission or from any final decision or order upon rehearing or 
reconsideration by the administrative agency." Idaho Appellant Rule 11(d). 
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2. Standard of Review for Contract Interpretation Issues 
The interpretation of the legal effect of a contract is a question oflaw over which this 
Court exercises de novo review. Howard v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co., 13 7 Idaho 214, 46 P .3d 
510, (2002). Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination and effect of a 
contractual provision is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Tolley v. THI. Co., 140 
Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004). Interpreting contracts and applying law to undisputed facts 
constitutes matters oflaw which this Court also reviews de novo. Fisk v. Royal Carribean 
Cruises, Ltd., 141 Idaho 290,292, 108 P.3d 990, 992 (2004). 
3. Standard of Review for the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order 
When this Court reviews a decision of the Industrial Commission, it reviews questions of 
fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's 
findings. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). This Court "views all 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the 
Commission." Boley v. State, Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 280, 939 P.2d 
854, 856 (1997). However, this Court exercises free review over questions oflaw that are 
presented. Ogden, 128 Idaho at 88, 910 P.2d at 760. Application oflegislative acts present pure 
questions oflaw over which this Court exercises free review. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 
132 Idaho 902,905-06,980 P.2d 566, 569-70 (1999). 
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B. Analysis 
1. The Order is Not a Final Decision or Order as Required by Idaho Appellate 
Rule ll(d) 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (d), an appeal may only be taken"[ f]rom any final 
decision or order of the Industrial Commission or from any final decision or order upon rehearing 
or reconsideration by the administrative agency." Unlike subsection (a) of Rule 11, this 
subsection does not refer to certification of a partial judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b). Instead, a "final decision or order" from the Commission is necessary for an 
appeal. 
A "final decision or order" from the Industrial Commission must dispose of all of the 
claimant's claims to be appealable. Hartman v. Double L Mfg., 141 Idaho 456, 457, 111 P.3d 
141, 142 (2005). "A determination of liability without the determination of the amount of 
compensation is not a final order." !d. at 458, 111 P .3d at 142. Retention of jurisdiction by the 
Industrial Commission, "by its very nature infers that there is neither a final determination of the 
case nor a final permanent award to claimant." !d. (quoting Jensen v. The Pillsbury Co., 121 
Idaho 127, 127, 823, P.2d 161, 161 (1992)). 
In Hartman, the Industrial Commission found that the employer and its surety were liable 
for a portion of disability and Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") was liable for the 
remainder, but it did not determine the extent ofiSIF's liability. !d. at 458, 111 P.3d at 142. 
Similarly, where the Industrial Commission only determined whether an employer in an appeal 
from the Department of Employment paid wages and whether those wages were paid in covered 
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employment, but did not determine the period for which contributions were due or the amount of 
liability, the Court found the Industrial Commission had not resolved all issues regarding liability 
and thus the case did not present an appeal as a matter of right under Rule 11(d). Dep 't of 
Employment v. Hopper, 126 Idaho 144, 144, 879 P.2d 1077, 1077 (1994). 
The Order is clearly not a final determination of all of Izaguirre's claims in this case. 
Due to the bifurcation of issues to be decided by the Industrial Commission, Izaguirre's 
entitlement to all forms of worker's compensation benefits has not been decided. (R., p. 72.) 
("Further, it is Ordered that the issues originally scheduled to be heard on June 3, 2011, as 
outlined in the January 12, 2011, Notice ofHearing shall be reserved and held in abeyance for a 
future hearing.") (Emphasis in original). Izaguirre's appeal is therefore premature and should be 
dismissed. 
2. The Terms of the Release of All Claims and Indemnity Agreement Require 
Izaguirre to Satisfy Respondents' Subrogation Interest, with No Exceptions. 
The interpretation of a settlement agreement follows the same rules applied to all 
contracts. See Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 186, 75 P.3d 743, 747 (2003) 
(interpreting both a settlement agreement and an operating agreement). "When the language of a 
contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are questions of law." !d. at 
185,75 P.3d at 746 (citation omitted). "An unambiguous contract will be given its plain 
meaning." !d. "The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered." !d. "In determining the intent of the 
parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole." !d. (citation omitted). "If a contract is 
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found ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. /d. (citation omitted). "Whether a 
contract is ambiguous is a question oflaw." /d. "A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably 
subject to conflicting interpretations." !d. 
On October 22, 2009, Izaguirre and his wife entered into the Release of All Claims and 
Indemnity Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") with third parties Ameri-Co Carriers, Inc. and 
Jimmy L. Crossland. (R., pp. 42-45; Ex. A.) The Settlement Agreement provides, in pertinent 
part, that Izaguirre and his wife, as "further consideration" for the Settlement Agreement, 
"promise and covenant to satisfY and pay ... any person, company or entity which has or may 
claim a right to reimbursement ... arising from or caused by the accident or incident described 
herein, including but not limited to the Idaho State Insurance Fund or any other worker's 
compensation .... " (R., p. 42; Ex. A.) (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, this promise and 
covenant to satisfY and pay extends to "damage of any kind" suffered by Izaguirre and his wife. 
(/d.) Thus, Izaguirre and his wife, both of whom signed the Settlement Agreement, expressly 
contracted to satisfY and pay any and all subrogees, including worker's compensation subrogees. 
The language of the Settlement Agreement could not be clearer in regards to Izaguirre's 
obligation to repay Respondents out of the settlement proceeds which surely must have been 
understood by Izaguirre and his attorney. The Settlement Agreement does not provide for any 
exceptions to this duty to satisfY subrogees. Therefore, by the terms of the contract, of which 
Respondents are third party beneficiaries, Respondents' right to subrogation extends to the 
entirety of the settlement proceeds to the extent of their liability. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber 
Co., 140 Idaho 702,708,99 P.3d 1092, 1098 (Ct. App. 2004). Izaguirre's obligations under the 
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Settlement Agreement provide an alternative basis for affirming the ruling of the Industrial 
Commission 
3. The Industrial Commission Properly Decided That Respondents' 
Subrot:ation Rit:hts Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(3) Extend to All of 
Izaguirre's Third-Party Settlement Proceeds, Includint: Any Potential 
Monies for Pain and Suffering. 
Izaguirre contends that general damages, particularly for pain and suffering, are excluded 
from Respondents' statutory right of subrogation. According to Izaguirre, Respondents are only 
entitled to that (undefined and un-characterized) portion oflzaguirre's settlement proceeds 
attributable to special damages, which he classifies as both past and future medical and 
indemnity benefits. However, Idaho worker's compensation law does not recognize such an 
exception to the right of subrogation under Idaho Code§ 72-223(3). Neither Idaho precedent nor 
the express language ofldaho Code § 72-223(3) itself support Izaguirre's position. The contrary 
is true. Both the express language ofldaho Code§ 72-223(3) and Idaho case law interpreting 
Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) support the Industrial Commission's ruling that Respondents' statutory 
subrogation right extends to the entirety oflzaguirre's settlement proceeds. 
a. The Plain and Unambiguous Language of Idaho Code § 72-223 Does 
Not Create an Exception to a Surety's Right of Subrogation. 
The plain language of Idaho Code§ 72-223 demonstrates that Izaguirre's argument fails. 
Interpretation of the statute "begins with the literal words of the statute, and ' [ w ]here the 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction."' Ward v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., Inc., 150 Idaho 501, 
504, 248 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2011) (emphasis added). "The statute is viewed as a whole, and the 
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analysis begins with the language of the statute, which is given its plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning. In determining the ordinary meaning of the statute, effect must be given to all the 
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." Twin 
Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214,216,254 P.3d 1210, 1212 (2011). 
Izaguirre reads a limit into Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) that does not exist. To find 
Izaguirre's limit, the Court must ignore Idaho Code§ 72-223 as a whole and focus on the 
following language in isolation: "to the extent of the employer's compensation liability." I.C. 
§ 72-223(3). More specifically, Izaguirre places great emphasis on the word "compensation"1 as 
used in Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) and argues that it "indicates the desire to limit the right of 
subrogation." (Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) Respondents do not dispute that the language ofldaho 
Code§ 72-223(3) creates a limit on their subrogation right. However, it is not a limit on their 
subrogation right as to the~ of damages to which their subrogation right attaches as Izaguirre 
contends. Instead, this language simply serves as a limit or cap on the amount of Respondents' 
subrogation right against the third party tortfeasor. 
Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) must be read in conjunction with Idaho Code§ 72-223(2), 
which provides: "Action may be instituted against such third party by the employee, or in event 
compensation has been claimed and awarded, by the employee and employer jointly, in the 
employee's name, or, if the employee refuses to participate in such action, by the employer in the 
employee's name." Idaho Code§ 72-223(2) establishes the employer's prospective right to bring 
1 "Compensation used collectively means any or all income benefits and the medical and 
related benefits and medical services." I. C. § 72-1 02(7). 
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an action against a third-party tortfeasor once the employee claims or is awarded compensation. 
Idaho Code § 72-223(3) then establishes the monetary limit of the subrogation right against the 
third-party tortfeasor. 
Unlike lien statutes from other jurisdictions that focus on rights to benefits held by the 
employee, Idaho Code § 72-223(3) is a subrogation statute that places the employer/surety in the 
shoes of the employee and focuses on the amount of damages that may be sought by the 
employer/surety under the right of subrogation. Thus, if the employer/surety is liable for a total 
of$100,000 in worker's compensation benefits to the employee, it cannot seek damages in 
excess of that amount. The status ofldaho Code§ 72-223(3) as a subrogation statute as opposed 
to a lien statute demonstrates it was not intended to differentiate types of damages an employee 
subsequently recovers from the third-party tortfeasor. Izaguirre has not cited any case law from 
Idaho that limits the right of subrogation- whether it be contractual, statutory or common law-
in the manner he suggests. 
Idaho Code§ 72-223(4) further supports the interpretation that Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) is 
not directed to the type of damages recovered by an employee. Idaho Code § 72-223( 4) provides 
in relevant part as follows: " ... upon any recovery by the employee against the third party, the 
employer shall pay or have deducted from its subrogated portion thereof, a proportionate share of 
the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the employee in obtaining such recovery." (Emphasis 
added). The wording ofldaho Code§ 72-223(4) is important for two reasons: (1) it establishes 
the only express limitation on the employer's subrogation right; and (2) it applies to any 
recovery, not just a recovery of benefits paid by the employer or its surety. If the Legislature had 
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intended the limit identified by Izaguirre, Idaho Code§ 72-223(4) would have clearly indicated it 
applied solely to "any recovery of compensation paid by the employer." 
Izaguirre finally argues that the language ofldaho Code§ 12-616 strongly indicates that 
the Legislature intended to limit the subrogation rights of worker's compensation subrogees. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11.) As explained above, Respondents do not dispute that Idaho Code 
§ 72-223(3) contains a limit on their subrogation right. However, unlike Izaguirre, Respondents 
recognize that the limit set forth in Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) is a limit on the amount of its 
subrogation right, not on the type of damages to which their subrogation right attaches. 
The plain language ofldaho Code § 72-223(3) simply does not support Izaguirre's 
argument and, as demonstrated below, neither does Idaho case law interpreting Idaho Code § 72-
223(3). The Industrial Commission properly interpreted Idaho Code § 72-223(3) and the Order 
should not be reversed on appeal. 
b. Idaho Case Law Supports the Industrial Commission's Order 
Entitling Respondents to a Right of Subrogation in the 
Entirety of Izaguirre's Third-Party Settlement Proceeds. 
As recognized by the Industrial Commission, this Court has already addressed whether an 
employee's entire, third-party settlement is subject to subrogation by the employer and its surety. 
In Struhs v. Prot. Techs., Inc., 133 Idaho 715,992 P.2d 164 (1999), this Court engaged in a 
comprehensive examination of the employer's/surety's subrogation rights in an employee's third-
party settlement. Izaguirre attempts to distinguish Struhs because it did not involve a situation 
where "the Surety and Claimant participated in a hearing in which both parties were accorded the 
right to offer evidence and argument with regard to the proper allocation of the third-party 
-11-
settlement and the legal effect ofthat allocation." (Appellant's Brief, p. 21.) Izaguirre's attempt 
to distinguish Struhs is misplaced. The holding in Struhs is precisely what makes the need for 
the type of hearing contemplated by Izaguirre unnecessary. 
In Struhs, claimant was employed by American Protective Services who, in tum, was 
provided worker's compensation coverage by Wausau Insurance Companies ("Wausau"). 133 
Idaho at 716, 992 P.2d at 165. On September 30, 1988, while in the course ofhis work, claimant 
was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a vehicle owned by the U.S. Army ("Army"). !d. 
at 717, 992 P.2d at 166. As a result of the accident, Wausau paid claimant $21,743.33 in 
worker's compensation benefits. !d. 
Through his attorney, claimant filed a notice of tort claim with the Army and 
subsequently entered into negotiations to settle his third-party claim. !d. Based upon its position 
that it was "entitled to a reduction of damages equal to the amount ofworkmens' compensation 
benefits received by Mr. Struhs from [Wausau]," the Army took the position that any settlement 
with claimant would not include worker's compensation benefits paid by Wausau. !d. (quoting 
letter from Army dated March 12, 1992.) Ultimately, the Army paid claimant $45,000 in full 
satisfaction of his claims and the parties characterized the settlement proceeds as "general 
damages" in the settlement agreement. !d. at 721, 992 P .2d at 170. 
Despite the clear agreement and intent of the Army and claimant that the settlement only 
covered general damages, the Industrial Commission found in favor of Wausau on the issue of 
whether it was subrogated to the third-party recovery. !d. at 718, 992 P.2d at 167. Claimant 
moved for reconsideration, which the Industrial Commission denied. !d. 
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On appeal, claimant argued that "the terms ofhis settlement with the Army, which 
characterized the recovery as 'general damages,' barred Wausau from recovering reimbursement 
from the settlement monies." !d. at 721,992 P.2d at 170. This Court disagreed and affirmed 
"the Industrial Commission's conclusion that Wausau could exercise it subrogation rights against 
Struhs' settlement with the Army." !d.; see also Schneider v. Farmers Merchant, Inc., 106 Idaho 
241,244,678 P.2d 33, 36 (1983) ("where the employer is not negligent, the employer is entitled 
to subrogate to the employee's recovery against a third party, and thus obtain a reimbursement of 
the [worker's] compensation benefits he paid.") 
In reaching its holding in Struhs, this Court first cited Vaught v. Dairy/and Ins. Co., 131 
Idaho 357, 361, 956 P.2d 674, 678 (1998) and Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 
755, 757, 947 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1997) for the proposition that "an insurer is not bound by a 
decision to which it was not a party." In Vaught, the Court held an insurer was not bound by a 
judgment entered in favor of its insured in federal court against a third-party tortfeasor and, in 
Anderson, the Court held an insurer was not bound by a default judgment entered in favor of its 
insured against a third-party tortfeasor. Following this citation to Vaught and Anderson, the 
Court held that"[ e ]mployers have a statutory right to subrogation, and any characterization of 
damages to which the employer is not privy cannot change the employer's statutory rights." !d. 
(emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Struhs, characterization without the involvement of the 
employer/surety is irrelevant to the employer's/surety's statutory right to subrogation, regardless 
of whether it is done by settlement, arbitration, or judgement. 
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The irrelevance of a characterization of damages reached without the employer' s/surety' s 
involvement is critical to what the Court did not do next in Struhs. It did not remand the case to 
the Industrial Commission to make a finding regarding how much of the $45,000 third-party 
settlement should have been apportioned to compensation for which the employer/surety was 
liable. The Court effectively held that the entire $45,000 third-party settlement was subject to 
statutory subrogation. If the language ofldaho Code§ 72-223(3) contained the exception 
Izaguirre contends exists, the Court in Struhs would surely have taken this next step because, 
unlike here, the employee and tortfeasor in Struhs expressly characterized the settlement 
proceeds as general damages and did not even consider an allocation to worker's compensation 
benefits paid by the employer/surety. 
The Court's decision to not remand the case makes sense in light of its understanding of 
subrogation under Idaho Code § 72-223: 
The wording ofi.C. § 72-223(3) dates to 1971, when the 
legislature recodified the worker's compensation title. 1971 Idaho 
Sess. Laws ch. 124. The legislative purpose was, in part, to 
"prescrib[ e] the rights, duties, obligations and liabilities of 
employers, employees and sureties." ... The dual purposes of 
subrogation under I.C. § 72-223 are to achieve an equitable 
distribution between responsible parties "by assuring that the 
discharge of an obligation be paid by the person who in equity and 
good conscience ought to pay it" and "to prevent the injured 
claimant from obtaining a double recovery for an injury." ... Neither 
of these purposes would be served by a rule that forbids recovery 
by an employer who voluntarily pays benefits. Such a rule would 
undercut expeditious payment of claims by sureties and result in 
delay and unnecessary litigation. 
Jd. at 719, 992 P.2d at 168 (citations omitted). 
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Since the purpose of subrogation under Idaho Code § 72-223(3) is equitable distribution, 
a remand to allocate the settlement in Struhs would have defeated this purpose because the only 
relevant consideration under subrogation is proper distribution of funds to the parties without 
regard to how those funds are characterized. 
This understanding of subrogation leads to a further flaw in Izaguirre's interpretation of 
Idaho Code § 72-223(3). The Struhs Court held that it "has interpreted I. C. § 72-223(2) to mean 
that only one action may be brought against the third party." !d. at 721, 992 P .2d at 170. "There 
is but one cause of action under the statute, and one right to subrogation, and if the action is 
brought in the employee's name the employer and surety are bound by estoppel to the results of 
that trial conducted by the employee." ld. (quoting Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Prods., Inc., 107 
Idaho 389, 396, 690 P.2d 324, 331 (1984).) If the employer/surety is estopped from proceeding 
directly against the third-party tortfeasor after the employee has settled with the third-party 
tortfeasor, the employer/surety is bound by the amount of the employee's settlement. Application 
of Izaguirre's proposed limit on the subrogation right of the employer/surety works to the 
prejudice of the employer/surety because it could result in the employer/surety not recovering the 
entire subrogation interest even though additional settlement funds- characterized as general 
damages -are available. Under that scenario, the third-party tortfeasor will have avoided its 
obligation to pay in equity and good conscience what it ought to pay, which defeats the purpose 
of subrogation. Conversely, under the Industrial Commission's interpretation ofldaho Code 
§ 72-233(3), the employee is not prejudiced because he controls the amount recovered from the 
third-party tortfeasor. See Struhs, 133 Idaho at 722, 992 P.2d at 171 ("[claimant] voluntarily 
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chose to accept a settlement that, according to him, did not include payment of his full tort 
damages.") Iflzaguirre settled for an amount that does not properly account for the 
Respondents' full subrogation interest, it should not be Respondents that bear the impact of that 
decision. 
It should also be noted that Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) was not amended by the Legislature 
in response to Struhs. Instead, thirteen years later, Izaguirre and Amicus now attempt to make 
new law in this Court. This should not be permitted. 
Although not cited in Struhs, the Court's decision was entirely consistent with its prior 
holding in Shields v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 95 Idaho 572, 513 P.2d 404 (1973), wherein the 
Court addressed the purpose behind the worker's compensation law under the prior version of 
Idaho Code§ 72-223(3). With facts similar to those in the present matter, the issue on appeal in 
Shields was whether the employer and its surety were subrogated to the employee's net 
settlement recovery or entitled to a credit in the amount of the settlement. The claimant argued 
that since he entered into his third-party settlement before his claim and award of worker's 
compensation benefits, the employer and surety possessed no right to subrogation. The Court 
disagreed; it stressed the Legislature's intent to avoid double recovery and quoted Larson on 
Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 2, § 71-20, as follows: 
"It is equally elementary that the claimant should not be allowed to 
keep the entire amount both ofhis compensation award and of his 
common-law damage recovery. The obvious disposition of the 
matter is to give the employer so much of the negligence 
recovery as is necessary to reimburse him for his compensation 
outlay, and to give the employee the excess. This is fair to 
everyone concerned; the employer, who in a fault sense is neutral, 
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comes out even; the third person pays exactly the damages he 
would normally pay, which is correct, since to reduce his burden 
because of the relation between the employer and the employee 
would be a windfall to him which he has done nothing to deserve; 
and the employee gets a fuller reimbursement for actual damages 
sustained than is possible under the compensation system alone." 
Shields, 95 Idaho at 573-74, 513 P.2d at 405-06 (emphasis added). Thus, since at least 1973, 
Idaho has recognized the employer's/surety's right to be fully subrogated to the employee's third-
party recovery, without regard to characterization of damages. The holding in Struhs simply 
reinforced this purpose. 
Following Shields, this Court interpreted Idaho Code § 72-223 in Cameron v. Minidoka 
County Highway District, 125 Idaho 801, 874 P.2d 1108 (1994), where it held, "when an 
employer is liable to a claimant for worker's compensation benefits, and the claimant obtains a 
recovery against a third party for the same injuries, the employer becomes subrogated to the 
claimant's rights in the third party recovery to the extent of the employer's compensation 
liability." 125 Idaho at 803, 874 P.2d at 1110. The Court did not hold that the employer is only 
subrogated to the portion of claimant's rights in the third party recovery paid as special damages. 
Instead, the Court further held: "The plain wording of the statute entitles employers to benefit 
from third party recoveries to the extent of their compensation liability, whether the employer has 
already paid the compensation or the compensation liability remains to be paid in the future." Id. 
Cameron thus provides further support for the employer's right to be fully subrogated to both 
benefits already paid and those paid in the future. 
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In the present matter, the Industrial Commission properly followed well-established Idaho 
precedent and reached the correct determination on Izaguirre's claim. First, the Industrial 
Commission recognized that Izaguirre's unilateral attempt to characterize the third-party 
settlement proceeds as general damages was invalid. Second, the Industrial Commission 
recognized that this Court did not require- or even imply the potential for- apportionment of 
damages between special and general damages. Finally, it followed Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) and 
Struhs to rule that the entirety oflzaguirre's settlement was subject to Respondents' statutory 
subrogation right. The Industrial Commission did not stray from this Court's clear precedent; it 
followed it to the letter and should not be reversed for doing so. 
c. The Law of Other Jurisdictions Supports Respondents' Entitlement 
to a Right of Subrogation in the Entirety of Claimant's Third Party 
Settlement. 
The language used in Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) is unique to Idaho. Although other state 
worker's compensation statutes contain similar language, the differences in language used affect 
the analysis of those statutes and create problems when trying to analogize case law interpreting 
these statutes to Idaho Code§ 72-223(3). Nevertheless, despite these differences, the majority 
rule is that an employer/surety is entitled to complete subrogation regardless of how damages in a 
settlement, judgment, or award are characterized. See United States v. Lorenzetti, 467 U.S. 167, 
178, 104 S. Ct. 2284, 2291 (1984) (citing Larson, The Law ofWorkmen's Compensation§ 74.35 
(1982) ("the prevailing rule under state workmen's compensation statutes is that an employer is 
fully entitled to be reimbursed from third-party recoveries for pain and suffering, even when the 
portion of an award attributable to pain and suffering is clearly separable from the portion 
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attributable to economic losses.")). The case law cited by Izaguirre from those jurisdictions 
following the minority rule does not support a reversal of the Industrial Commission's decision. 
Instead, those cases highlight the differences in statutory schemes used in other states and further 
demonstrate the problems with attempting to compare Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) with other third-
party recovery statutes. 
i. The Majority Rule Is That an Employer/Surety Is Entitled to a 
Right of Subrogation from the Entirety of a Claimant's Third-
party Settlement. 
In Lorenzetti, the United States Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation to that 
presented here, in the context of whether an employee who receives benefits under the Federal 
Employees' Compensation Act ("FECA") is required to reimburse the United States for those 
payments when he obtains a third party tort recovery solely for noneconomic losses such as pain 
and suffering. 467 U.S. at 168. The Court held as follows: 
!d. at 179. 
[W]e hold that [FECA] entitles the United States to be reimbursed 
for FECA compensation out of any damages award or settlement 
made in satisfaction of third-party liability for personal injury or 
death, regardless of whether the award or settlement is for losses 
other than medical expenses and lost wages.2 
In Lorenzetti, the plaintiff received $1,970.81 in FECA benefits and settled his third-party 
tort action for $8,500, which represented compensation for noneconomic losses alone. !d. at 
2 Similar to the holding in Struhs, the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
disregards any characterization of damages from the third-party liability case, which in tum 
eliminates the need for the Department of Labor to conduct an apportionment as Izaguirre 
suggests. 
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169-170. Under state no-fault law, the plaintiff was precluded from seeking economic damages 
in his tort action. !d. Nevertheless, the United States still sought recovery from the third-party 
settlement. Id. The relevant language from FECA provides as follows: 
If an injury or death for which compensation is payable under 
[FECA] is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in a 
person other than the United States to pay damages, and a 
beneficiary entitled to compensation from the United States for that 
injury or death receives money or property in satisfaction of that 
liability as the result of suit or settlement by him or in his behalf, 
the beneficiary, after deducting therefrom the costs of suit and 
reasonable attorney's fees, shall refund to the United States the 
amount of compensation paid by the United States and credit any 
surplus on future payments of compensation payable to him for the 
same injury. 
Id. at 170-71 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8132). 
Like Izaguirre, the plaintiff in Lorenzetti believed the United States' position was unfair 
and argued that the right of reimbursement was confined to recovery out of damages awards or 
settlements for economic losses of the sort covered by FECA; thus an award or settlement 
confined to noneconomic losses like pain and suffering was immune from recovery. !d. at 171. 
The Supreme Court found that§ 8132 ofFECA imposed only two conditions precedent to an 
employee's obligation to refund the compensation paid by the United States: (1) the employee 
must have suffered an injury or death under circumstances creating a legal liability in a third 
party to pay damages; and (2) the employee must have received money in satisfaction of that 
liability. !d. at 173-74. Both conditions were met when the plaintiff was injured in an 
automobile accident that gave rise to third party liability and he received $8,500 in satisfaction of 
his claim for damages. !d. at 174. The Supreme Court held that the statute "expressly creates a 
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general right of reimbursement that obtains without regard to whether the employee's third-party 
recovery includes losses that are excluded from FECA coverage." !d. Thus, the United States 
was entitled to reimbursement from the entirety of the plaintiff's third party recovery. !d. Idaho 
Code§ 72-223(3) similarly creates such a complete right to recover the full amount of the 
employer's compensation liability from a third-party settlement, regardless ofhow damages in 
that settlement are characterized. 
The United States Supreme Court also found that its interpretation of § 8132 was 
reinforced by parallel terms in § 8131, which required an employee to assign a right of action to 
enforce third party liability to the United States or prosecute the action himself. !d. at 175. The 
Supreme Court noted that right established under § 8131 is an ''unqualified one" and "does not 
excuse an employee whose only cause of action is for elements of loss that are not compensable 
under FECA." !d. In other words, the United States Supreme Court applied the same analysis to 
the interplay between § § 8132 and 8131 that applies to the interplay between Idaho Code § § 72-
223(2) and (3). In neither situation is there a limitation as to the type of damages against which 
the statutory right may be asserted. 
Perhaps most important to the analysis oflzaguirre's appeal was the Court's examination 
of the purpose of FECA: 
[T]he purpose of§ 8132 is not simply to prevent double recoveries 
but to minimize the cost of the FECA program to the Federal 
Government...It is self-evident that the latter goal is directly 
advanced by allowing the United States to obtain reimbursement 
out of any third-party recovery, regardless of whether the third-
party recovery includes compensation for losses other than medical 
expenses and lost wages. 
-21-
!d. at 177 (citation omitted); see also Hutchins v. US. Dept. Of Labor, 2012 WL 2354248, *4 
(4th Cir. 20 12) (citing Lorenzetti for the proposition that the goal of FECA is "directly advanced 
by allowing the United States to obtain reimbursement out of any third-party recovery.") (italics 
in original); Bell v. United States, 754 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir. 1985) (affirming general right of 
recovery against recovery of non-economic losses); Green v. United States Dep 't of Labor, 77 5 
F .2d 964 (8th Cir. 1985). 
In Idaho, concern for the rights of employers under the worker's compensation system is 
just as important a concern for the protection of the federal government under FECA. Indeed, the 
"purpose of the worker's compensation act is not only to provide relief for workers but also to 
protect industry by providing a limit on liability." Meisner v. Potlach Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 262, 
954 p .2d 676, 680 (1998). 
"The purpose of these laws was to provide 'not only for employees 
a remedy which is both expeditious and independent of proof of 
fault, but also for employers a liability which is limited and 
determinative.' Thus, anything that tends to erode the 
exclusiveness of either the liability or the recovery strikes at the 
very foundation of statutory schemes of this kind, now universally 
accepted and acknowledged." 
Stample v. Idaho Power Co., 92 Idaho 763, 766, 450 P.2d 610, 613 (1969) (citation omitted). 
Iflzaguirre's interpretation ofldaho Code§ 72-223(3) is accepted, there is no doubt that 
the "limited and determinative" nature of employers' liability will be eroded. Rather than relying 
on their present right to recover the full extent of their compensation liability from the 
employee's third-party recovery, employers will be placed in the time-consuming and expensive 
position of proceeding to an allocation/characterization hearing before the Industrial 
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Commission, which the Industrial Commission has already said it is "both ill-equipped and 
disinclined to undertake." (R., p. 109, ~ 46.) 
Recognition that the employer is entitled to a right of subrogation to the entirety of a 
claimant's third-party award is not limited to FECA. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
similarly upheld full recovery from a third-party settlement, regardless of characterization of 
damages, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), which 
provides as follows: 
[T]he employer shall be required to pay as compensation under this 
chapter a sum equal to the excess of the amount which the 
Secretary determines is payable on account of such injury or death 
over the net amount recovered against such third person. Such net 
amount shall be equal to the actual amount recovered less the 
expenses reasonably incurred by such person in respect to such 
proceedings (including reasonable attorneys' fees). 
Force v. Dir., Office of Workers' Camp. Programs, 938 F.2d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 
33 U.S.C. § 933(f)). The Court found that "[o]n its face, the statute does not distinguish among 
the various types of damages that might be recovered in a third party action for a particular injury 
or death. It simply says that an employer may offset 'the net amount recovered against such third 
person' .... " !d. at 984 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 933(f)). Thus, the employer was entitled to offset 
non-economic damages such as pain and suffering and punitive damages. !d.; see also Jacques v. 
Kalmar Indus., AB, 8 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 1993) (allowing subrogation against award of punitive 
damages); Brandt v. Stidham Tire Co., 785 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (allowing complete 
subrogation without damages for pain and suffering). Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) similarly does not 
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distinguish among various types of damages, but merely places a monetary limit on Respondents' 
statutory subrogation right. 
Numerous states, including Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, Kansas, and Tennessee have 
followed the prevailing rule and found that the right of subrogation extends to general damages 
recovered in a third party action. See, e.g., Estate of Eddington v. Eppert Oil Co., 490 N.W. 2d 
872 (Mich. 1992) (the Supreme Court of Michigan holding that an employer is entitled to seek 
reimbursement from the entire amount of the third party tort recovery regardless of the 
classification of the damages); Nelson v. Rothering, 478 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) 
(Court of Appeals of Wisconsin holding that, even where the proceeds of the third party claim 
are divided between separate claims or among elements of damages, the right of reimbursement 
applies to the total amount); Dearing v. Perry, 499 N.E. 2d 268, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Court 
of Appeals ofindiana holding that the right to subrogation included general damages as its 
"legislature did not distinguish between amounts recovered for which the insurance carrier is 
responsible such as medical expenses and amounts recovered for which the carrier is not 
responsible such as pain and suffering); and Beam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 477 S.W.2d 510, 
513 {Tenn. 1972 ) ("legislative intent is to reimburse an employer for payments made under a 
Workrnans' Compensation award from the 'next recovery' obtained by the employee.") 
The holding in McGranahan v. McGough, 820 P .2d 403 (Kan. 1991 ), is perhaps most 
instructive because in McGough, the court analyzed Izaguirre's theory and still held that the 
employer/surety is permitted complete rights in damages characterized as pain and suffering. 
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In McGough, claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident while working for his 
employer. 249 Kan. at 330, 820 P.2d at 405. As a result of the accident, claimant received 
$12,616.29 in worker's compensation benefits. !d. Claimant thereafter entered into a stipulated 
judgment with the third-party tortfeasor providing the following stipulated damages: (1) $6,000 
to claimant for past and future pain and suffering; (2) $3,000 to claimant's wife for past and 
future loss of service; and (3) $1,000 for reasonable and necessary medical expenses related to 
claimant's injury. Id. at 331, 820 P.2d at 406. Claimant's employer and its surety intervened and 
objected to the stipulated judgment. !d. at 332, 820 P.2d at 407. Nevertheless, the stipulated 
judgment was entered and the employer and surety appealed. 
After an appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals, the Kansas Supreme Court granted a 
petition of review to decide, among other things, whether the employer and surety had a 
subrogation right in the $6,000 award in damages to claimant for past and future pain and 
suffering. See id. The Court commenced its analysis by interpreting the Kansas subrogation 
statute, which provides as follows: 
"In the event of recovery from such other person by the injured 
worker or the dependents or personal representatives of a deceased 
worker by judgment, settlement or otherwise, the employer shall be 
subrogated to the extent of the compensation and medical aid 
provided by the employer to the date of such recovery and shall 
have a lien therefor against such recovery and the employer may 
intervene in any action to protect and enforce such lien." 
Id. at 334, 820 P.2d at 407 (quoting K.S.A.1990 Supp. 44-504(b)) (italics in original). 
The Court initially observed that the statute "indicates a recovery that is not 
compensable workers compensation is not subject to subrogation" because the statute "expressly 
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states the employer is allowed to subrogate to the extent the employer has paid compensation and 
medical aid." !d. at 334, 820 P.2d at 408 (emphasis added). However, the Court did not stop its 
analysis there and further examined the scope of damages recoverable under the worker's 
compensation laws. The Court observed that "[h]istorically, workers compensation does not 
compensate directly an employee for pain and suffering." !d. at 335, 820 P.2d at 409. "Workers 
compensation does, however, compensate for pain and suffering if it interferes with the ability to 
perform labor." !d. Therefore, the Court had "little difficulty in concluding that pain and 
suffering is such an integral part of determining work disability that any such recovery for pain 
and suffering is subject to the subrogation rights of an employer pursuant to K.S.A.1990 Supp. 
44-504."3 !d. 
Similar to Kansas, Idaho has long recognized that benefits under its worker's 
compensations laws encompass aspects of pain and suffering. In Close v. General Const. Co., 61 
Idaho 689, 106 P.2d 1007 (1940), the Court addressed the issue ofwhether the Industrial 
Accident Board, under former Idaho Code § 43-1113, must credit the compensation paid for 
partial loss ofleg against a subsequent award for total loss of the leg. In deciding the issue, the 
Court observed "[a]nother thing that should be considered in this connection is the pain and 
suffering and physical and financial loss which the workman sustains by reason of one of these 
injuries." !d. at 695, 106 P.3d at 1009. "The legislature must have intended, in fixing this 
3 Citing Larson, The Law ofWorkmen's Compensation§ 74:35, 14-542 to- 543 (1990), 
the Court also recognized that its holding "follows the majority view." McGough, 249 Kan. at 
336, 820 P.2d at 409. 
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schedule of indemnities, to take into consideration in some measure all of these elements, along 
with the loss of earning power .... " !d.; see also Cookv. Cook, 102 Idaho 651,654 n. 3, 637 P.2d 
799,802 (1981) (post-recodification recognition of the purpose expressed in Close.) 
There should be no dispute that pain and suffering impact an employee's ability to work 
to some degree and the Legislature surely must have factored that into Idaho's overall worker's 
compensation scheme. While Respondents do not agree that the language of Idaho Code § 72-
223(3) "indicates" a preclusion against subrogation in an employee's pain and suffering damages, 
even if it did, the general purpose of Idaho's worker's compensation laws weighs against such a 
finding. This Court should affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission. 
ii. The Case Law Cited by Izaguirre Is Non-Binding, 
Distinguishable and Does Not Provide a Basis for Reversing 
the Industrial Commission's Decision. 
Izaguirre cites cases from three jurisdictions that have adopted the minority view that a 
right of subrogation may be limited to just economic damages awarded in a third-party action. 
Disregarding the different statutory schemes used in those jurisdictions that differ greatly from 
Idaho's, none of these cases provide a sound basis for reversing the decision of the Industrial 
Commission. 
Izaguirre begins his analysis with cases from the state of Kentucky, where according to 
Izaguirre, Hillman v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 631 S.W. 2d 848 (Ky. 1982), is "the leading case 
in Kentucky on the issue of workers' compensation subrogation rights." (Appellant's Brief, p. 
13.) While Izaguirre properly cites the facts and holding from Hillman, he fails to recognize its 
fundamental flaws when applied to Idaho and the facts of the present matter. 
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First, Hillman provides no analysis regarding the language of Kentucky's subrogation 
statute, KRS 342.700(1), or of the legislature's intent. The Court simply jumped to the 
conclusion and held that to "the extent... that the recovery against the tortfeasor represents items 
of damage (e.g., pain and suffering) not covered by workers' compensation, the carrier has no 
right against that recovery at all." Hillman, 631 S.W.2d at 850. Second, the underlying basis of 
Hillman is that in Kentucky the employer/surety is bound by a characterization of damages in a 
judgment entered in the third-party tort action between the employee and the third-party 
tortfeasor. See id. This is in direct conflict with Idaho law which does not bind the 
employer/surety to a characterization of damages in a settlement, award, or judgment in which it 
was not involved. See Struhs, 133 Idaho at 71, 992 P.2d at 171. Kentucky's divergent position 
regarding the rights of the employer/surety signals a similar divergence in the purpose behind its 
worker's compensation laws and raises doubt as to whether reliance on Kentucky law is sound. 
The other Kentucky decision cited by Izaguirre is Mastin v. Liberal Mkts., 674 S.W. 2d 7 
(Ky. 1984), which relies exclusively on Hillman as the basis for its holding that the 
employer's/surety's subrogation interest was limited to damages that duplicated worker's 
compensation benefits. 674 S.W.2d at 12-13. The difference in Mastin is that rather than 
analyzing an already-entered judgment, the Court was faced with an un-allocated settlement. See 
id. To solve this issue, the case was remanded to the "trial court to decide the proper amount 
which should be awarded [claimant] in damages for each of the various elements of damages 
specified in the release." !d. 
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This leads to the problem raised by the Industrial Commission in its Order, but ignored by 
Izaguirre, i.e., whether the Industrial Commission should (or can) allocate or characterize 
damages in a third-party settlement. The Industrial Commission has clearly signaled its position 
that it is "both ill-equipped and disinclined to undertake" such a procedure. (R., p. 109,, 46.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Izaguirre has not cited any basis for the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction to 
make such a determination. If such a sweeping change to Idaho's worker's compensation law is 
to occur, it should occur in the Legislature, not in the courts. 
Relying on Tobin v. Department of Labor & Industries, 239 P .3d 544 (Wash. 201 0), 
Izaguirre moves to the State of Washington to find support for his position. Tobin involved the 
interpretation ofRCW 51.24.060(1), which provides that "any recovery" obtained from a third 
party action "shall be distributed" according to the statute's distribution formula, which requires 
payment in the following order: (a) attorney fees and costs, (b) 25 percent to the injured worker 
free of any claim by the Department, (c) to the Department "the balance of the recovery made, 
but only to the extent necessary to reimburse [the Department] for benefits paid" and (d) to the 
injured worker "[a]ny remaining balance." 239 P.3d at 400-01 (citing RCW 51.24.060(1)). This 
is clearly a different statutory scheme and payment process than is found in Idaho Code § 72-
223(3) and Izaguirre's analysis by analogy to RCW 51.24.060(1) is misplaced. 
RCW 51.24.060(1) is akin to a lien statute. Conversely, Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) is a 
subrogation statute that places the employer/surety in the shoes of the employee. While RCW 
51.24.060(1) addresses distribution of what has already been recovered by the employee against 
the third-party tortfeasor, Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) addresses the employer's prospective 
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subrogation right against the third-party tortfeasor. The two statutes address different purposes 
and cannot be analogized. 
In addition, Tobin would not apply to the facts presented here. Just this year, the 
Washington Court of Appeals held that "Tobin's rule applies only to allocated settlements, and 
the trial court therefore properly declined to consider [claimant's] claim." Davis v. Washington 
State Dept. of Labor and Industries, 116 Wash.App. 494,495,268 P.3d 1033, 1034 (Wash.App. 
Div. 1 2012). The Court relied on the holding in Gersema v. Allstate Ins. Co., 112 P.3d 552 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005), where it previously held that since the claimant received an 
undifferentiated settlement it was impossible to determine what portion was attributable to 
general damages and what portion was attributable to special damages and, therefore, the 
employer was entitled to a future offset in the entire remainder of the excess recovery from the 
third party settlement. Davis, 166 Wash.App. at 499-500, 268 P.3d at 1036. The Court in Davis 
also relied on Mills v. Department of Labor & Industries, 865 P .2d 41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994 ), in 
which the parties' failure to allocate a portion of the worker's lump-sum recovery to a loss of 
consortium claim was found to subject the entire award to the Department's lien for benefits paid 
or potentially payable to the claimant. (See id.) 
Most importantly, as in Struhs, the Davis Court did not remand the case for the trial court 
to perform an allocation: 
Davis contends that if allocation is not ordered, the Department 
will recover funds to which it is not entitled. She also suggests that 
here, unlike in Mills and Gersema, the record does indicate an 
allocation to general damages. But the only evidence to which 
Davis points is her settlement demand to the third party, a 
-30-
unilateral document written before the settlement that reveals 
nothing about the third party's intent--or even Davis's-at the time 
of settlement. There is no way for an allocation to be made without 
speculating about the parties' intent at settlement. Stated 
differently, it is impossible to verify from the record that any part 
of Davis's settlement in fact constitutes funds to which the 
Department is not entitled under Tobin. 
Id. at 502, 268 P.3d at 1036. 
Similar to the settlement in Davis, Izaguirre's settlement does not contain an allocation of 
damages between special and general damages. Therefore, even under Washington law, 
Izaguirre's appeal fails. 
Claimant finally cites to Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority v. Jorgensen, 992 
P.2d 1156 (Colo. 2000), in support ofhis position. Jorgensen relies on a statutory scheme that 
also differs greatly from Idaho Code § 72-223(3). The Colorado statute specifically provides 
that: 
The right of subrogation provided by this section shall apply to and 
include all compensation and all medical, hospital, dental, funeral, 
and other benefits and expenses to which the employee or the 
employee's dependents are entitled under the provisions of said 
articles ... or for which the employee's employer or insurance 
carrier is liable or has assumed liability. 
C.R.S.A. § 8-41-203(1) (1999). The Court found that the statute defines the subrogation rights of 
the compensation insurer as extending to the injured employee's rights to recover economic 
damages against the tortfeasor and does not include every right to recovery against the tortfeasor. 
992 P.2d at 1165. However, Colorado has since clarified its statute, stating that the right to 
recover future benefits "[s]hall not extend to moneys collected for noneconomic damages 
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awarded for pain and suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress, or impairment of quality of 
life." C.R.S.A. § 8-41-203(1)(d)(II). Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) clearly does not make such 
distinction. The amendment to C.R.S.A. § 8-41-203(1) also demonstrates that if 
employers' /surety's subrogation rights under Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) are going to be changed, 
the proper place to make those changes is in the Legislature. 
The minority view favored by Izaguirre simply does not work in Idaho under its current 
worker's compensation scheme due to the differences in statutory language among the worker's 
compensation laws of the several states. More importantly, the holding in Struhs speaks directly 
to the issue on appeal and holds in favor of the Industrial Commission's ruling that Respondents 
have a complete statutory right to subrogation under Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) in Izaguirre's third-
party settlement funds regardless of how those funds are characterized. The Industrial 
Commission agreed and its decision should be affirmed. 
4. The Industrial Commission Properly Decided Not to Designate Part of 
Izaguirre's Third-Party Settlement as Pain and Suffering Damages. 
Izaguirre requests that if this Court finds that the Industrial Commission erred in its 
decision, it will be necessary to remand this case to the Industrial Commission so that an 
allocation can be made on additional factual findings. (Appellant's Brief, p. 22.) As mentioned 
above, the problem with Izaguirre's request is that he has not provided any authority or 
explanation regarding how the Industrial Commission is to make such an allocation or whether it 
even has jurisdiction to make such an allocation. This exemplifies the problem with Izaguirre's 
appeal, i.e., Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) was not designed to permit such allocations and the 
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Industrial Commission is ill-equipped to make them- as the Industrial Commission itself 
declared. If Izaguirre prevails on his appeal, a completely new process is going to need to be 
established for the Industrial Commission which will find itself as the surrogate for the finder of 
fact in every third-party liability case. There is no indication that the Legislature intended such a 
result. Therefore, the Industrial Commission's ruling should be affirmed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Respondents request that Izaguirre's appeal be dismissed because it is not a final decision 
or order as required under Idaho Appellate Rule ll(d). If the appeal is not dismissed, 
Respondents request that the Court affirm the Industrial Commission's Order or, in the 
alternative, affirm the Industrial Commission's ruling on the basis that the Settlement Agreement 
expressly establishes Izaguirre's duty to fully satisfY Respondents' subrogation interest out of his 
settlement proceeds. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _i_Q___ day of July, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Richard Owen 
RICHARD OWEN LAW OFFICE 
206 12th A venue Road 
P.O. Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
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